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TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF ADOLESCENT EGO DEVELOPMENT: The "New Look" at Adolescent Egocentrism

Daniel K. Lapsley, Ph.D.

The theoretical and empirical status of the traditional theory of adolescent egocentrism is examined and found wanting. An alternative theory is reviewed that reconceptualizes the ideational patterns of "egocentrism" as adaptational and coping functions of ego development, avoids anomalies found in the traditional theory, and promises a progressive research program.

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The theory of adolescent egocentrism developed by Elkind *(1967)* has proven to be one of the most popular and durable in the adolescence literature, in part because it seems to explain a spectrum of observed typical adolescent behavior and affect in terms of a theoretical framework that is itself rich, suggestive, and plausible. At the time of the theory's formulation, the framework available to Elkind was, of course, Piaget's theory of intellectual development. Consequently, the theory of adolescent egocentrism is essentially a cognitive developmental account of adolescence.

The present paper re-examines the conceptual and empirical status of this theory and articulates an alternative that offers a number of advantages, among them potential for an integrative theory of adolescent ego development and for insights regarding adolescent mental health and adjustment. This alternative theory might be said to represent a "progressive problemshift" *(Lakatos, 1978)* in our understanding of "egocentric" phenomena in adolescence.

ADOLESCENT EGOCENTRISM

Traditional Account

Egocentrism is a Piagetian concept that refers to a lack of differentiation between some aspect of self and other. According to Elkind *(1967)*, each of Piaget's major cognitive developmental stages (sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operations, and formal operations) has associated with it a characteristic differentiation failure, or egocentrism; adolescent egocentrism is that which is characteristic of formal operations. The differentiation failure of formal operations was described by Elkind in the following way:

> [F]ormal operational thought not only enables the adolescent to conceptualize his thoughts, it also permits him to conceptualize the thoughts of other people. It is this capacity to take account of other people's thought, however, which is the crux of adolescent egocentrism. This egocentrism emerges because, while the adolescent can now cognize the thoughts of others, he fails to differentiate between the objects towards which the thoughts of others are directed and those which are the focus of his own concern. *(p. 1029)*

A revised version of a paper submitted to the Journal in June 1992. *Author is at the Department of Psychology, Brandon University, Brandon, Manitoba, Canada.*

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The Piagetian nature of this hypothesis is revealed by examining how the etiology of adolescent egocentrism rests upon the twin pillars of formal thought, "thinking about thinking" and "thinking about possibilities." Because adolescents can now "think about thinking," they are more introspective and self-reflective. And because they can now "think about the possible," adolescents wonder what might be going on in the minds of other people. At this point, however, the differentiation failure—the inability to distinguish between one's own preoccupations, which consist of self-concerns, and the preoccupations and concerns of others—is made evident. To adopt the stance of the adolescent, "When I try to imagine what you are thinking about, I think you are 'thinking about me'—I think you are as obsessed with me as I am about myself."

Two ideational patterns are said to be the consequence of adolescent egocentrism. One pattern, called the "imaginary audience" (IA), was described by Elkind *(1967)* as the chronic tendency on the part of the adolescent to see the self as the object of others' attention, or the tendency to anticipate the reaction of others to the self in real or imagined situations. It is an "audience" because the adolescent believes that he or she will be the center of attention. It is "imaginary" because, in actuality, this is not typically the case. The IA is invoked to explain a variety of adolescent phenomena, e.g., heightened adolescent self-consciousness, flamboyant behavior and faddish dress, great need for privacy and reluctance for self-disclosure, concern with shame, shyness, and embarrassment—all of which are reactions that reflect the feeling of constantly being evaluated, watched, and judged by peers. More recently, Elkind *(1985)* has suggested that the IA construct might be useful for understanding anorexia nervosa and perhaps other clinical phenomena as well.

The second ideation pattern has been called the "personal fable" (PF). Adolescents construct fables about themselves that stress the themes of personal uniqueness ("Nobody thinks or feels the way I do"), omnipotence, and invulnerability. The PF is invoked to account for the prevalence of adolescent risk-taking and the seeming disregard for danger and for the consequences of imprudence in social behavior of all kinds. These examples illustrate Elkind's assumption that the tendency to construct IAs and PFs is a lamentable feature of adolescent development. It is a sure sign of cognitive immaturity, since it greatly impairs veridical social judgment. And the danger is not over until formal operations are consolidated in middle adolescence, around age 16, when the tendency to entertain these twin ideations is thought to attenuate.

Besides its link to the consolidation of formal operations, the attenuation of adolescent egocentrism is also thought to result from greater social experience. For example, when the adolescent becomes involved in intimate relationships, he or she will discover that one is not so unique that one's perspective cannot be shared or that one's feelings cannot be understood. Greater social experience will also tend to invalidate the egocentric hypotheses that the adolescent is willing to entertain about the social concerns of others, revealing to the adolescent that one is not typically the axis around which the social world of others revolves.

Evidential Warrant

Empirical research on the adolescent egocentrism theory can be historically reconstructed in terms of three phases *(Lapsley, 1990)*. The first phase was concerned with operationalizing the IA and PF constructs, and with charting age and gender effects from early to late adolescence *(Adams & Jones, 1981; Elkind & Bowen, 1979; Enright, Lapsley, & Shukla, 1979; Enright, Shukla, & Lapsley, 1980; Lechner & Rosenthal, 1983)*. Three rather different assessment strategies emerged in the litera-

ture during this phase. For the most part, these studies, using cross-sectional designs, showed that IA and PF ideation were pronounced in early adolescence, with declines evident by middle or late adolescence, although the decline was often fitful and uneven; and that girls were more concerned with the IA and PF than were boys, although this, too, was not always consistent *(Lapsley, 1990)*.

In general, the empirical results of the first phase of research were typically interpreted as being broadly supportive of Elkind's theory. Some researchers also examined how the IA dovetailed with different patterns of family interaction. In two such studies *(Adams & Jones, 1982; Riley, Adams, & Nielsen, 1984)*, the one consistent finding was that teenagers who reported problematic relations with parents also reported higher IA scores. This finding defies an easy interpretation if the IA is understood as an expression of egocentrism, since conflict is typically conceived to be a mechanism that moves one from an egocentric position to one that is decentered and perspectival. This apparent anomaly is better accounted for by the "new look," discussed below.

The chief defect of these early studies was that they failed to test the critical assumption of the egocentrism theory that linked the onset of IA and PF ideation to the emergence of formal operational thought. Testing this assumption was the task of the second phase of research but the results were not encouraging. Three studies found either that IA and PF scores were highest in concrete operational subjects or that formal thought diminished these ideations *(Goossens, 1984; Gray & Hudson, 1984; Riley et al., 1984)*. Two additional studies found uniformly null relations between formal thought and measures of IA and PF *(Lapsley, Milstead, Quintana, Flannery, & Buss, 1986)*. It would appear, then, that the crucial assumption of the theory does not have empirical support.

It also became apparent, however, that there were anomalies internal to the theory as well. Lapsley and Murphy *(Lapsley, 1985; Lapsley & Murphy, 1985)* argued, for example, that the mechanism for transition out of adolescent egocentrism was inconsistent with the transition mechanisms established for prior variants of egocentrism in the prior cognitive developmental stages, and that even this mechanism was inconsistent with Piagetian formulations. In this regard, Elkind *(1967)* maintained that the egocentrism characteristic of the sensorimotor, preoperational, and concrete operational stages is overcome by the emergence of the next stage in the sequence. Yet, this explanation is at variance with the more consistent Piagetian notion that it is the accommodatory compensations brought about by the consolidation of a given stage that restore a more veridical cognitive stance *(Chandler, 1977)*. Hence, Elkind's account of how one is freed from the egocentrisms of childhood (by the emergence of the next stage) appears to be inconsistent with Piagetian theory, although his appeal to Piaget's theory is most explicit. But even if Elkind's "next stage" mechanism is to be preferred over the Piagetian accommodation mechanism, it is inconsistently applied to the case of formal operational egocentrism. Here, Elkind abandoned the "next stage" mechanism in favor of the consolidation hypothesis in accounting for how one transcends adolescent egocentrism, since there is clearly no next stage after formal operations to act as liberator. This inconsistency in the application of transition principles is a matter of some concern.

So, too, is the reliance on social factors (e.g, intimacy, social interaction, entering the role structure of society) to account for the diminution of adolescent egocentrism, that is, to motivate stage consolidation, only for the apparently special case of formal operational egocentrism, although it is doubtful that social factors are operative in this respect only in middle adolescence *(Broughton, 1983)*. The cumulative effect of these doubts is to raise the possibility

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that adolescent "egocentrism" is of a different order altogether and cannot easily be located within the context of the childhood egocentrisms of logical development *(Lapsley & Murphy, 1985)*.

There are additional difficulties. The egocentric perspective-taking error that is attributed to adolescents as a consequence of adolescent egocentrism is actually more correctly characteristic of much younger children, although, in all fairness, the perspective-taking sequences were not well understood when Elkind formulated his theory *(Selman, 1980)*. Furthermore, analysis has shown that Elkind's Imaginary Audience Scale *(Elkind & Bowen, 1979)*, the preferred assessment of IA, though purporting to assess an aspect of egocentrism, a differentiation error, is, in actuality, a measure of self-consciousness *(Lapsley & Murphy, 1985; Lechner & Rosenthal, 1983)*. There is no clear necessity for accepting a measure of self-consciousness as a marker of cognitive egocentrism.

Finally, there are now grave doubts that formal operations have much to do with the formation of the adolescent personality. According to Blasi and Hoeffel *(1974)*, the "cognitive developmental hypothesis of adolescence," of which Elkind's theory is a vivid example, is conceptually flawed. There is nothing about formal operations that should lead one to think that ostensibly typical features of adolescence are grounded in the fact that the adolescent is a formal operator; this is underscored by the observation that so few adults, let alone adolescents, are formal operational in the first place *(Keating & Clark, 1980; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971)*. If formal operations are what makes possible the personological features of adolescence, and if so few teenagers are actually formal operational, then one would have to conclude, paradoxically, that most teenagers are not, in fact, adolescents *(Broughton, 1983; Lapsley, 1990)*.

While the cognitive egocentrism account of the IA and PF has thus not been vindicated, mere criticism is never decisive. That the cognitive developmental account of the adolescent personality is a degenerating research program can only be demonstrated by an alternative conceptual model that possesses generative power to anticipate novel facts, to corroborate some of them, and to explain the anomalies of the preceding theory *(Lakatos, 1978)*. In other words, there can be no refutation before the emergence of a better theory *(Serlin & Lapsley, 1990, 1993)*.

THE "NEW LOOK"

One way of conceptualizing the IA and PF constructs is to consider them aspects of the "second phase of separation-individuation" *(Blos, 1962)*. Separation-individuation is clearly one of the hallmarks of the adolescent experience. The process plays an important role in psychodynamic accounts of adolescence, but it also figures prominently in family systems theory *(Gavazzi & Sabatelli, 1990; Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985)*. Individuation has been defined as the process by which "a person becomes increasingly differentiated from a past or present relational context" *(Karpel, 1976, p. 66)*, and it entails both intrapsychic and interpersonal changes. Consequently, the adolescent's struggle for individuation is to be fought on two fronts: on an *intrapsychic* front, where the adolescent cognitively reorders childhood identifications and the childhood sense of self, and delineates the self in such a way that a mature sense of interdependence is achieved; and on the *interpersonal* front, with "reality parents," which involves a renegotiation of family relationship structures in such a way that mature connectedness is established and maintained *(Allison & Sabatelli, 1988)*. Family systems theorists point out that, on the reality front, families exhibit varying levels of tolerance for individuation *(Farley, 1979)*. In well-differentiated families, individuation is encouraged within a family context that maintains an appropriate balance between separation and connectedness *(Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985)*. In con-

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trast, poorly differentiated families force the adolescent to make stark and untenable choices between individuality and belonging. For example, if the emphasis is on becoming an individuated self, one risks narcissistic isolation. But if the emphasis is on relationships and belonging, one risks becoming enmeshed in them; one risks *becoming* one's relationship (wherein the self dissolves), rather than being an individuated self who *has* relationships *(Kegan, 1982).*

One of the most influential current approaches to separation-individuation is the work of Grotevant and Cooper *(1985, 1986; see also Youniss & Smollar, 1985).* In their analysis of parent-adolescent dialogues, they found that healthy individuation, as reflected in communication patterns, was indicated when the adolescent exhibited in his or her speech the twin themes of assertion and connectedness. Similarly, Bakan *(1966)* argued that the "duality of human existence" is captured by the themes of agency and communion, and that it is around these themes that our lives take much of their meaning.

The dialectic between assertion and connectedness and between agency and communion, then, appears to be the measure of how individuation is advanced within the interpersonal context of the family, i.e., the themes around which the adolescent must renegotiate his or her position with "reality parents." Yet, individuation must be advanced on the intrapsychic front as well, a front that is traditionally conceptualized by psychoanalytically informed theories *(Blos, 1962; Josselson, 1980, 1988).* And it is on this front that the IA and PF constructs take on added significance: the IA reflects the themes of connectedness and communion and the PF expresses the concern for agency and assertion. To justify this claim, one must look at Blos's influential account of separation-individuation.

According to Blos *(1962),* the adolescent must manage two important tasks during separation-individuation. The first is to maintain a hold on interpersonal relations (given the decathexis of the object world). The second is to maintain a hold on the self by the re-establishment of firm ego boundaries (boundaries that have been blurred by the decathexis of parental identifications). The first task is advanced by object relational ideation. The second task is advanced by the "willful creation of ego states of a poignant internal perception of the self" by means of the "self-observing ego" *(Blos, 1962, p. 98).*

Object relational ideation describes the private interpersonal fantasies that prepare the adolescent for interpersonal transactions. These make-believe ideations are cognitive preparations for actual interpersonal transactions, as the adolescent stands at the transition between narcissistic isolation and mature connectedness. Consequently, object relational fantasies are "trial actions" or "visions of the self" *(Josselson, 1980)* that allow the adolescent to experiment with interpersonal relations in a variety of imagined scenarios or to otherwise assimilate, in manageable doses, the emotional experience of social participation. Blos *(1962)* argued that the "as if" quality of make-believe object relations is an attempt to enrich an impoverished ego and to compensate for object loss.

The keen perception of inner life by a self-observing ego is motivated by the desire to reestablish firm ego boundaries. "Self-induced ego states of affective and sensory intensity allow the ego to experience a feeling of self and thus protect the integrity of its boundaries and its cohesion" *(Blos, 1962, p. 92).* Two important consequences follow. First, the adolescent is said to experience a sense of personal uniqueness, given the keen perception of his or her inner life. Second, the adolescent experiences a surge of personal agency and a sense of invulnerability. "This circumstance gives the individual a false sense of power which in turn impairs his judgment in critical situations" *(Blos, 1962, p. 100).*

The implications of Blos's account of separation-individuation for understanding

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the IA and PF become apparent. What Blos termed "object relational ideation" is theoretically equivalent to what Elkind has called the "imaginary audience." That is, IA is a form of object relational ideation (masturbation fantasies are another form) that allows the adolescent to maintain interpersonal connectedness during the course of psychological separation, even if only in imagination. The construction of imaginary audiences and visions of the self in various interpersonal scenarios serves defensive and restitutive functions. They constitute trial actions, make-believe relationships that prepare the adolescent for mature connectedness *(Lapsley & Rice, 1988)* or otherwise compensate for the absence or loss of object relations.

Similarly, what Blos termed "poignant internal perceptions of the self" result in a state that is theoretically equivalent to that of Elkind's PF *(Lapsley & Rice, 1988)*. Elkind *(1967)* described the PF in this way:

> Perhaps because he believes he is of importance to so many people, the imaginary audience, he comes to regard himself, and particularly his feelings, as something special and unique. Only he can suffer with such agonized intensity, or experience such exquisite rapture. The emotional torments...exemplify the adolescent's belief in the uniqueness of his own emotional experience. *(p. 1031)*

Blos *(1962)* described this state using very similar language:

> It is as if the adolescent experiences the world with a unique sensory quality that is not shared by others: "Nobody ever felt the way I do"; "Nobody sees the world the way I do." *(p. 93)*

The grandiosity of the PF is also reflected in the surge of personal agency and sense of indestructability that Blos described as an outcome of the "self-induced ego states of a poignant internal perception of the self" *(Blos, 1962, p. 98)*.

Elkind's account of the IA and PF and Blos's account of the ideational features of separation-individuation, then, appear to refer to identical phenomena. Indeed, the new look suggests that the IA and PF can no longer be considered instantiations of logical egocentrism, but are better conceptualized as defensive and restitutive concomitants of adolescent ego development that are constructed during the separation-individuation process. In addition, this new look suggests that these ideations are not merely unfortunate and lamentable features of adolescent development, but are, in fact, important coping mechanisms that contribute to the resilience of adolescents as they face the travails of growing up. Indeed, the propensity for engaging object relational ideation and for constructing personal fables is probably not restricted to adolescence; it is, rather, a common response to object loss and narcissistic injury.

The latter assertion—that the creation of personal fables and the tendency to engage in object relational (IA) ideation can both be viewed as contributors to psychosocial resilience and coping—must seem quixotic to partisans of the traditional view that veridical contact with reality is the hallmark of mental health *(Jahoda, 1958; Vaillant, 1977)*. But this traditional view of mental health has been severely challenged in recent years. For example, in a major review of the social cognitive literature, Taylor and Brown *(Taylor, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988)* concluded that

> ...contrary to much traditional, psychological wisdom, the mentally healthy person may not be fully cognizant of the day-to-day flotsam and jetsam of life. Rather, the mentally healthy person appears to have the enviable capacity to distort reality in a direction that enhances self-esteem, maintains beliefs in personal efficacy, and promotes an optimistic view of the future. *(Taylor & Brown, 1988, pp. 203–204)*

Similarly, and in contrast to the views of both Elkind *(1967)* and Blos *(1962)*, the new look suggests that personal fables and object relational ideation are not unfortunate aspects of adolescent development but are, instead, normative, adaptive "illusions" that allow the adolescent (and post-adolescent) to cope with the process of self-delineation and individuation and are, thus, positive features of the adolescent ex-

perience to the extent that they contribute to resilience and coping. From this perspective the apparent anomaly noted by two studies *(Adams & Jones, 1982; Riley et al., 1984)* in the first phase of research can now be given a straightforward explanation: adolescents who have conflictual relations with parents report higher IA scores because object relational ideation is a compensation for poor, absent, or lost interpersonal relationships. When interpersonal relations are problematic, we tend to engage in IA (object relational) ideation as a restitutive coping defense mechanism.

Recent empirical research has given encouraging support to the ego developmental reading of the IA and PF constructs. For example, Lapsley, FitzGerald, Rice, and Jackson *(1989)* reported a theoretically consistent pattern of correlations between the IA and PF and various aspects of separation-individuation as measured by the Separation-Individuation Test of Adolescence *(Levine, Green, & Millon, 1986)*. The IA was positively correlated with scales reflecting a concern with object relational features of separation-individuation, such as engulfment, symbiosis, succorance, enmeshment, and separation anxiety. The PF was positively correlated with "dependency denial" and self-centeredness, and was negatively correlated with separation anxiety and engulfment anxiety. Furthermore, males reported more PF ideation and more self-centeredness, while females showed higher scores on measures of enmeshment, engulfment, symbiosis, and separation anxiety.

These results, which have been widely replicated *(Docherty, 1992; FitzGerald & Lapsley, 1992; Milstead, Hale, & Lapsley, 1993)*, illustrate a number of key points. First, IA and PF ideations may serve different functions during separation-individuation. The IA, as an expression of object relational ideation, is constructed because of the loss of parental introjects. The PF, on the other hand, serves to deny dependency needs and separation anxiety through agentic self-centeredness. Hence, the IA seems to express the anxiety associated with the loss of object ties, while the PF is a restitutive defense against it. Indeed, there is evidence that PF ideation not only serves as a buffering function with respect to the various separation anxieties, as noted, but may also inoculate adolescents against a broad array of negative affects *(Greenberg et al., 1992; Schonert-Reichl, in press)*. Second, insofar as the IA was consistently correlated with object relational features of separation-individuation and the PF was correlated with agentic self-assertion, credence is given to the claim that the IA and PF reflect, on the intrapsychic level, the twin themes of assertion (PF) and connectedness (IA) that others have noted as being essential to the individuation process *(Grotevant & Cooper, 1986)*. The concern with relationships and with connectedness and the anxiety over their potential loss is bound up with IA (object relational) ideations, while individuation, the other side of the separation-individuation coin, is empowered by PF constructions *(Lapsley et al., 1989)*. Third, the pattern of sex differences supports a claim that is often heard in the adolescence literature *(Gilligan, 1982; Josselson, 1988)*, namely, that the themes of connectedness, communion, bondedness, and attachment are distinctly feminine developmental themes, while autonomy, separation, and independence are typically masculine themes.

There appears, then, to be some justification for the claim that the IA and PF constructs are important aspects of the separation-individuation process of adolescence. Consequently, these constructs are poorly located within the context of Piagetian egocentrisms and are better conceived as aspects of adolescent ego development.

This reading of the IA and PF, however, opens up the possibility of meaningful integration with social cognitive accounts of the adolescent self. This possibility will now be explored.

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INTEGRATIVE POSSIBILITIES

Some 20 years ago, Piaget *(1973)* noted that

> ...a day will come when the psychology of cognitive functions and psychoanalysis will have to fuse in a general theory which will improve both through mutual correction, and starting right now we should be preparing for that prospect by showing the relations which could exist between them. *(p. 250)*

Indeed, over the years there have been numerous attempts to integrate psychoanalysis and Piagetian genetic epistemology, with uncertain results *(Greenspan, 1979; Lester, 1983)*. Yet, in spite of the formidable difficulties, there is a widespread consensus that some rapprochement is necessary. The state of affairs whereby Piagetian theory is invoked to account for things "cognitive" and psychoanalytic theory for things "emotional" is clearly untenable, insofar as the human person is obviously not bifurcated along theoretical-paradigmatic lines. In recent years the search for integration has entered a new, third phase that directs the integrative efforts away from the orthodoxies of Freud's or Piaget's theories toward neo-Freudian object relational theories and neo-Piagetian accounts of social cognitive development *(Noam, Kohlberg, & Snarey, 1983)*. These neo-Piagetian theories *(Damon & Hart, 1988; Selman, 1980)* address more forthrightly the kinds of concerns (self, object relations) that are of interest to the object relational theorist *(Westen, 1991)*.

One account suggests that the tendency to construct IA and PF ideations is a problem of interpersonal understanding and that known developmental sequences that describe the ontogenesis of interpersonal understanding *(Damon & Hart, 1988; Selman, 1980)* would constitute a suitable social cognitive developmental framework for understanding the emergence and decline of these ideations from early to late adolescence. Lapsley and Murphy *(1985)* have argued, for example, that the social cognitive abilities afforded by Level 3 (early adolescence) in Selman's *(1980)* sequence are sufficient to account for the emergence of IA and PF ideation and that the emergence of the next stage (Level 4) accounts for their decline in later adolescence. Unlike Elkind's *(1967)* theory, no appeal to a consolidation hypothesis is required to account for the emergence and diminution of IA and PF ideations. This social cognitive reading of the IA and PF opens up a number of integrative possibilities.

The strong integrative thesis suggests that separation-individuation will commence whenever an adolescent reaches a certain social cognitive developmental understanding of the self, say, at Selman's *(1980)* Level 3 (see Milstead et al. *[1993]* on the possibility that Level 2 may suffice). The weak integrative thesis suggests that, however separation-individuation commences (perhaps with the onset of puberty, as suggested by Blos and intimated by Elkind), the course of psychological individuation will not prove traumatic if the adolescent also has the social cognitive wherewithal to engage in IA and PF ideations, which serve coping and defensive functions. That is, there will be no *sturm und drang* if the adolescent begins the psychological separation process at Level 3. Storm and stress will only be endemic among those adolescents who begin the individuation process before they are able to access the ideational resources (IA, PF) that would provide a measure of coping (i.e, are at Level 2 in Selman's sequence). These are conjectures, of course, but they do suggest points of contact between psychodynamic accounts of the adolescent ego and social cognitive developmental accounts of the adolescent self. If the IA and PF are indeed outcomes of social cognitive development *(Lapsley & Murphy, 1985)*, and if these ideations are indeed reflected in the separation-individuation process *(Lapsley & Rice, 1988)*, then the IA and PF are the bridge constructs through which a meaningful integration of the two paradigms may well be effected.

CONCLUSION

This new look at the IA and PF appears to represent a reconcepualization in our understanding of the adolescent personality. It argues that the IA and PF are important derivatives of adolescent separation-individuation and that they serve broad adaptational and coping functions. These novel hypotheses have been widely corroborated. The new look also suggests that the IA and PF may serve as integrative constructs that bridge social cognitive accounts of the adolescent self with psychodynamic accounts of the adolescent ego. Finally, the new look also avoids a variety of anomalies associated with the preceding theory. Hence, the model being advanced here can be said to be a theoretically progressive research program insofar as it accounts for the anomalies of the earlier theory and has generative power to anticipate novel lines of research. The new look appears to be an empirically progressive research program as well, inasmuch as some of its theoretical content has been corroborated.

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For reprints: Daniel K. Lapsley, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brandon University, Brandon, Manitoba R7A 6A9, Canada